The story so far:

 

  1. It's Not Always The Network! Or is it? Part 1 -- by John Herbert (jgherbert)
  2. It's Not Always The Network! Or is it? Part 2 -- by John Herbert (jgherbert)
  3. It's Not Always The Network! Or is it? Part 3 -- by Tom Hollingsworth (networkingnerd)
  4. It's Not Always The Network! Or is it? Part 4 -- by Tom Hollingsworth (networkingnerd)
  5. It's Not Always The Network! Or is it? Part 5 -- by John Herbert (jgherbert)

 

Things always crop up when you least expect them, don't they? Here's the sixth installment, by Tom Hollingsworth (networkingnerd).

 

The View From Above: James, CEO

 

One of the perks of being CEO is that I get to eat well. This week was no exception, and on Tuesday night I found myself at an amazing French restaurant with the Board of Directors. The subject of our recent database issues came up, and the rest of the Board expressed how impressed they were with the CTO's organization, in particular the technical leadership and collaboration shown by Amanda. It's unusual that they get visibility of an individual in that way, so she has clearly made a big impact. Other IT managers have also approached me and told me how helpful she is; I think she has a great career ahead of her here. As dessert arrived and the topic of conversation moved on, I felt my smartwatch buzzing as a text message came in. I glanced down at my wrist and turned pale at the first lines of the message on the screen:

 

URGENT! We have a security breach...

 

I excused myself from the table and made a call to find out more. The news was not good. Apparently, we had been sent a message saying that our customer data has been obtained, and it will be made available on the black market if we don't pay them a pretty large sum of money. It made no sense; we have some of the best security tools out there, and we follow all those compliance programs to the letter. At least, I thought we did. How did this data get out? More to the point, would we be able to avoid paying the ransom? And even if we paid it, would the data be sold anyway? If this gets out, the damage to our reputation alone will cause us to lose new business, and I dread to think how many of our affected customers won't trust us with their data any more. The security team couldn't answer my questions, so I hung up and made another call, this time to Amanda.

 

 

The View From The Trenches: Amanda (Sr Network Manager)

 

I used to flinch every time I picked up phone calls from James. Now I can't help but wonder what problem he wants me to solve next. I must admit that I'm learning a lot more about the IT organization around here and it's making my ship run a lot tighter. We're documenting more quickly and anticipating the problems before they happen, and we have the Solarwinds tools to thank for a large portion of that. So I was pretty happy to answer a late evening call from James earlier this week, but this call was different. The moment he started speaking I knew something bad had happened, but I wasn't expecting to hear that our customer data had been stolen and was being ransomed. How far did this go? Did they just take customer data, or have they managed to extract the whole CRM database?

 

It's one thing to be fighting a board implementing bad ideas, but fighting hackers? This is huge! We're about to be in for a lot of bad press, and James is going to be spending a lot of time apologizing and hoping we don't lose all our customers. James told me that I am part of the Rapid Response Team being set up by Vince, the Head of IT Security, and I have the authority to do whatever I need to do to help them find out how to get this fixed. James says he's willing to pay the ransom if the team is unable to track the breach, but he's worried that unless we find the source, he'll just be asked to pay again a week later. I grabbed my keys and drove to the office.

 

I had barely sat down at my desk when Vince ran into my office. He was panting as he fell into one of my chairs, and breathlessly explained the problem in more detail. The message from the hacker included an attachment - a 'sample' containing a lot of sensitive customer data, including credit card numbers and social security numbers. The hacker wanted thousands of dollars in exchange for not selling it on the black market, and there was a deadline of just two days. I asked Vince if he had verified the contents of the attachment. He nodded his head slowly. There's no question about it. Somebody has access to our data.

 

I asked Vince when the last firewall audit happened. Thankfully, Vince said that his team audited the firewalls about once a month to make sure all the rules were accurate. I smiled to myself that we finally had someone in IT that knew the importance of regular checkups. Vince told me that the kept things up to date just in case he had to pull together a PCI audit. I told him to put the firewalls on the back burner and think about how the data could have been exfiltrated. He told me he wasn't sure on that one. I asked if he had any kind of monitoring tool like the ones I used on the network. He told me that he a Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) tool budgeted for next year. Isn't that always the way? I told him it was time we tried something out to get some data about this breach fast. We only had a couple of days before the hacker's deadline, so we needed to get some idea of what was going on, and quickly.

 

While the security engineers on the Rapid Response team continued their own investigations, Vince and I downloaded the Solarwinds Log and Event Manager (LEM) trial and installed it on my Solarwinds server. It only took an hour to get up and running. We pointed it at our servers and other systems and had it start collecting log data. We decided to create some rules for basic things, like best practices, to help us sort through the mountain of data we just started digesting. Vince and I worked to put in the important stuff, like our business policies about access rights and removable media, as well as telling the system to start looking for any strange file behavior.

 

As we let the system do its thing for a bit, I asked Vince if the hacker could have emailed the files out of the network. He smiled and told me he didn't think that was possible because they had just finished installing Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems a couple of months ago. It had caught quite a few people in accounting sending social security numbers in plain text emails, so Vince was sure that anything like that would have been caught quickly. I was impressed that Vince clearly knew what he was doing. He only took over as Head of IT Security about nine months back, and it seems like he has been transforming the team and putting in just the right processes and tools. His theory was that it was some kind of virus that was sending the data out a covert channel. Being in networking, I often hear things being blamed on the latest virus of the week, so I reserved my judgement until we knew more. All we could do now was wait while LEM did its thing, and the other security engineers continued their efforts as well. By this time it was well after midnight, and I put on a large pot of coffee.

 

When morning came and people started to come into work, we looked at the results from the first run at the data. Vince noted a few systems which needed to be secured to fall completely within PCI compliance rules. There was nothing major found, though; just a couple of little configurations that were missed. As we scrolled down the list though, Vince found a potential smoking gun. LEM had identified a machine in sales that had some kind of unknown trojan. On the same screen, the software offered the option to isolate the machine until it could be fixed. We both agreed that it needed to be done, so we removed the network connectivity for the machine through the LEM interface until we could send a tech down to remove the virus in person. More and more people were coming online now, so perhaps one of those systems would provide another possible cause.

 

We kept pushing through the data; we were now 18 hours into the two-day deadline. I was looking over the list of things we needed to check on when a new event popped up on the screen. I scrolled up to the top and read through it. A policy violation had occurred in our removable device policy rule. It looked like someone had unplugged a removable USB drive from their computer, and the system was powered off right after that. I checked the ID on the machine: it was one of the sales admins. I asked Vince if they had a way of tracking violations of the USB device policy. He told me that there shouldn't have been any violations as they had set a group policy in AD to prevent USB drives from being usable. I asked him about this machine in particular. Vince knitted his eyebrows together as he thought about the machine. He told me he was sure that it was covered too, but we both decided to walk down and take a look at it anyway.

 

We booted up the machine, and everything looked fine as it did the usual POST and came up to the Windows login screen. Wait, though; the background for the login screen was wrong. We have a corporate image on our machines with the company logo as the wallpaper. It wasn't popular but it also prevented incidents with more colorful pictures ... like the one I was looking at right now. Wow. Somehow this user had figured out how to change their wallpaper. I wondered what else this could mean. Vince and I spent an hour combing through the system. There were lots of non-standard things we found; lots of changes that shouldn't have been possible with our group policies (including the USB device policy), and the browser history of the user was clean. Not just clean from a perspective of sites visited, but completely cleared. Vince and I started to think that this system's user was someone we wanted to chat with.

 

I called James and told him we had a couple of possibilities to check out. He asked us to get back to him quickly; he had notified the rest of the Board, and they were pushing to hear that we had a solution as quickly as possible. Vince and I returned to my office and I scanned the SIEM tool for any new events while Vince contacted one of his team to arrange to have the suspect computer removed and re-imaged. Five minutes in, another event popped up. The same suspect system with the group policy had triggered an event for the insertion of a USB drive. I printed out the event, and Vince and I hurried back to the sales office to find out who had turned the computer on. We found the user hard at work, typing away; until, that is, we walked up to his desk. A flurry of mouse clicks later, he was back at his desktop. Vince asked him if he had anything plugged into his computer that wasn't supposed to be there. The user, a young man called Josh, said that he didn't. Vince showed him the event printout showing a USB drive being plugged in to the computer, but Josh shook his head and said that he didn't know what that was all about.

 

Vince wasn't having any of it. He started asking the sales admin all about the unauthorized changes on the machine that violated the group policies in place on the network. The sales admin didn't have an answer. He started looking around and stammering a bit as he tried to explain it. Finally, Vince said that he had enough. It was obvious something was going on and he wanted to get to the bottom of it. He told Josh to step away from the computer. Josh stood up and moved to the side, and Vince sat down at the computer, clicking around the system and looking for anything out of place. He glanced at the report from the Solarwinds SIEM tool, which showed that the drive was mounted in a specific folder location and not as a drive. As soon as he started clicking in the folder structure, Josh got visibly nervous. He kept inching closer to the chair and looked like he was about to grab the keyboard. When Vince clicked into the folder structure of the drive, his eyes got wide. Josh's head dropped and he stared resolutely at the carpet.

 

The post-mortem after that was actually pretty easy. Josh was the hacker who had stolen the information from our database. He had stored a huge amount of customer records on the USB drive and was adding more every day. He must have hit on the idea to ask us to pay for the records as a ransom, and he might have even been planning on selling them even if we paid up, although we'll never know. Vince's team analyzed the hard drive and found the exploits Josh had used to elevate his privileges enough to reverse the group policies that prevented him from reading and copying the customer data. We later found those privilege escalations in the mountain of data the SIEM collected. If we'd only had this kind of visibility before, we might have avoided this whole situation.

 

James came down to deal with the issue personally. Josh was pretty much frog-marched into a conference room, with James following close behind. The door slammed shut and the ensuing muffled shouting gave me some uncomfortable flashbacks to the day that my predecessor, Paul, was fired. Then Sam from Human Resources arrived with two of our attorneys from Legal in tow, and half an hour later Josh was being escorted from the building. I'm not privy to the exactly what the attorneys had Josh sign, but apparently he won't be making any noise about what he did.

 

From my perspective, I've built a really good relationship with the security team now, and of course, they've asked to keep Solarwinds Log and Event Manager. LEM paid for itself many times over this week, and there's no question that at some point it will help us avoid another crisis. For now though, James told Vince and I to take the rest of the week off. I'm not going to argue; I need some sleep!

 

 

>>> Continue reading this story in Part 7