“Spear phishing continues to be a favored means by APT attackers to infiltrate target networks”. - Trend Micro Research Paper 2012
“The reason for the growth in spear phishing: it works”. - FireEye Spear Phishing Attacks White Paper
One morning, a colleague in my data center network team and I received the following email:
I heard my colleague called the Help Desk and reported that he had clicked a link in an email that he thought a possible phishing email a few minutes before. It could be a damaging magical click to my company; it could make my company to the US headline news. But…
Two days before my colleague clicked the link on that phishing email…
Our Information Security (InfoSec) team coordinated with the Help Desk, Email team, Network Security team (my team), and an outside vendor to create a phishing email campaign as part of the user security education. The outcomes were favorable, meaning there were users beside my colleague failed the test. The follow-up user educations were convincing (of course, for those who failed…).
Above is an example of Phishing, that phishing emails attack mass audience. Cybercriminals, however, are increasingly using targeted attacks against individuals instead of large scale campaigns. The individually targeted attack, aka Spear Phishing, is usually associated with Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) for long term cyberespionage.
The following incidents show that spear phishing has been pretty “successful” and the damages were unthought-of.
Employees of more than 100 Email Service Providers (ESPs) experienced targeted email attacks. The well-crafted emails addressed those ESP employees by name. Even worse, email security company Return Path, the security provider to those ESPs, was also compromised.
Four individuals in the security firm RSA were recipients of the spear phishing malicious emails. The success of the attacks resulted the access of RSA’s proprietary information of the two-factor authentication platform SecurID by the cybercriminals. Due to the RSA breach, several US high-profile SecurID customers were compromised.
The White House confirmed that a computer system in the White House Military Office was attacked by Chinese hackers and that it affected an unclassified network. This hack began with a spear phishing attack against White House staffers and a White House Communications Agency staff opened an email he wasn’t supposed to open.
An Associated Press journalist clicked a link that appeared to be a Washington Post news story on a targeted email. The AP’s official Twitter account was then hacked. A fake tweet reporting two explosions in the White House erased $136 billion in equity market value from the New York Stock Exchange index. In the same year, a hacker group in China was said to have hacked more than 100 US companies via spear phishing emails, stealing proprietary manufacturing processes, business plans, communications data, etc. In addition, you remember Target’s massive data breach, right?
Unauthorized access to the Centralized Zone Data System (CZDS) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was obtained. ICANN is the overseer of the Internet’s addressing system. ICANN announced that they believed the compromised credentials were resulted from a spear phishing attack. By that attack, accesses to ICANN's public Governmental Advisory Committee wiki, blog, and whois information portal were also gained. Again, you still remember Home Depot’s 2014 breach that exposed 56 million payment cards and 53 million email addresses, right?
US confirmed that the Pentagon was hit by a spear phishing attack in July, most likely from Russian hackers, which compromised the information of around 4,000 military and civilian personnel who work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The hackers used automated social engineering tactics to gain information from employee social media accounts and then used that information to conduct a spear phishing attack.
How do we protect against and detect the increasing spear phishing attacks? Our beloved Defense-In-Depth comes to our mind. NGFW, IPS/IDS, SPF/DKIM key validations, signature-less analysis services for zero-day exploit detection, IP/domain reputation services, web proxy, and up-to-day client/server patching to name a few. Is the well-built security infrastructure sufficient for spear phishing? The incidents listed above tell us NO. In the case of RSA breach, it only took one out of four individuals who fell to the trap to make hackers happy. So, user education is an essential component of spear phishing defensive strategies. Make smarter users. Remind them not to fall into spear phishing trap regularly and send them mock phishing drills randomly.
I won’t ask you to share your spear phishing story. But how does your organization protect against spear phishing? What does your organization provide user awareness and training? Please share. I would like to hear from you.